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The forthcoming creation of a single European currency area will likely have far reaching
impacts on the competitive position of European industries, as a result of a decline in
transaction costs and currency risks for intra-European trade. These impacts will take place
independent of the question whether the 15 EU countries form an Optimum Currency Area or
not. The generally expected gains of trade from an integrated European market may therefore
not be Pareto-optimal, as a monetary union may have significant distributional impacts on
individual countries and regions. Then there will be winners and losers.
This paper addresses the welfare impacts of a single European currency area by investigating
industrial changes and shifts in location that may take place after the introduction of the
EURO, based on the idea that fixed exchange rated in the EMU will
be reflected in a decline in transportation costs and industrial clustering. The empirical
analysis uses an extensive data set on industrial production, interest rates and exchange rates
in the various European countries.
Two policy scenarios are envisaged, with a retrospective (backcasting) scenario on the likely
effects of (i) a fixed exchange rate in the past and (ii) a fixed exchange linkage with the US
dollar. Next, a neural network analysis is developed to trace for the two above mentioned
scenarios the foreseeable and likely welfare effects of a single monetary union. It is
concluded that the introduction of the EMU- according to the two past scenarios – would
have worsened for most European countries the industrial competitiveness.
1. Prologue
The European integration is not a single and simple event taking place at one moment
in time, but a long lasting evolutionary process with many ups and downs (see for an interes-
ting survey Jones 1996 and Swann 1996). The first integration plans date back to the early
post-war period, while the development of European integration will likely stretch far into the
next century. European integration encompasses more than market integration; it incorporates
also social, political, technological and monetary harmonization. After the completion of the
internal market and the steps towards opening up the European economic space towards
Central- and Eastern-Europe, much debate has in recent years centered around the challenges
of transforming the European Monetary System (EMS) into the Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU) (see e.g. Loureiro 1996). The EMS - already some twenty years in existence -
was put in operation to ensure monetary stability in European Community countries and acted
as a 'laboratory experiment' which might lead to a complete European monetary unification.3
Such an integrated financial market would favour economic efficiency and would discourage
national exchange rate policies aiming to achieve country-specific economic goals, while also
some financial discipline would be imposed on high-inflation countries (see Eichengreen et
al. 1995; De Grauwe 1994; Kenen 1995).
The road towards the EMU has been full of obstacles (see e.g. Alders et al. 1996). The
EMS system - with the European Currency Unit (ECU) as a central accounting unit - has
shown various tidal movements, and it has lasted until the Maastricht Treaty (1991) before a
decision was taken by the European member countries to pave the road towards the EMU. In
contrast to the EMS, the countries did not only commit themselves to a stable exchange rate,
but - more importantly - also to full monetary integration. The Maastricht Treaty has
formulated several strict convergence criteria to be fulfilled in order to qualify as an EMU
member. The most important criteria - which would encourage intra-EU convergence - are: a
public budget deficit of less than 3% of GDP (apart from very exceptional cases), a
government debt of at maximum 60% of GDP, and an inflation rate that is at maximum 1.5%
higher than the average of the lowest three EU countries. Such conditions would not only
serve as entry conditions, but would also have to be met during the stage of actual monetary
integration. The so-called Stability Pact stipulates that EU-countries jeopardizing the stability
of the EMU by inappropriate budgetary policies may be subject to a penalty. In this context,
the European Central Bank would become a very powerful agency (see also Canzeroni et al.
1994); it would also be responsible for maintaining a stable, low and single European interest
rate for the European currency, the Euro.
A historical decision was reached on May 1 and 2, 1998, when the eleven EU
countries which would qualify and were willing to join the EMU were named. These
countries have agreed on an irrevocable conversion rate between their currencies and the
single European currency. These eleven participants represent an important market of a
substantial critical mass (some 290 million consumers). The non-participating countries are:
Great-Britain, Denmark, Sweden and Greece. The reasons for their non-entry are different:
Great-Britain and Denmark have for the time being insufficient domestic support for the
Euro, Sweden has additionally not yet met the exchange rate requirement, and Greece has by
far not met any of the budgetary entry requirements.
The EMU will have significant consequences for EU macro-economic policy, e.g.
fiscal policy, tax harmonization, socio-economic expenditure policy, stabilisation policy etc.
It seems also plausible that in the near future important issues like fiscal federalism (i.e., the
question of allocation of taxation and public expenditure rules across different levels of
government) will come to the fore (see Van Aarle et al. 1997). Although thus far the main
interest has been in nominal convergence in the EU (reflected inter alia in inflation
convergence, exchange rate stability and low fiscal deficits), there is an increasing awareness4
of the uncertainties involved in real convergence, such as in the industrial sector and the
labour market (see also Heylen and Van Poeck 1995 and Jaeger and Parkinson 1994).
The expected benefits of the European economic and monetary integration have been
widely praised in recent years: free trade of goods, capital and labour; absence of exchange
rate risks among the EU countries; significant reduction of transaction costs for the industry.
These conditions would clearly favour the competitive position of Europe’s industry. But
some evident questions still remain: what is the order of magnitude of these benefits and how
are they distributed across sectors, countries and regions? More than a decade ago, the well-
known Cecchini report (1988) was published which tried to assess the efficiency gains of a
single European market. This report formed the economic basis for decision-making on the
completion of the internal market and offered the necessary quantitative foundation for
integration policies in Europe which would stimulate industrial development (see also Bange-
mann 1992 and Nicolaides 1992). Such quantitative estimates are at present lacking for the
industrial effects of the EMU. Clearly, the gains of the EMU will mainly depend on entrepre-
neurial response in Europe, e.g., in terms of flexibility, international orientation and
marketing. The business community has at present a portfolio of new opportunities offered by
an integrated and homogeneous European monetary market system.
The main question however, will be whether such a uniform market with entirely free
mobility of capital, labour and goods is likely to emerge in a European context. In contrast to
the USA, for instance, there is not a homogeneous culture, there are many language barriers,
and there is only a limited mobility of labour. This inertia may form serious impediments to
the achievement of full gains of European economic and monetary integration. In this
framework also the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) theory may provide important analytical
insights into the opportunities and barriers of monetary integration between different
countries (see Section 2).
In the light of the previous observations, this paper seeks to offer a critical assessment
of the expected benefits of economic and monetary integration for European industries. The
literature suggests that the success of integration policies depends largely on the existence or
emergence of an Optimum Currency Area (OCA) after monetary integration of distinct
countries. If the OCA conditions are not met, a non Pareto-optimal monetary union may
result with serious equity impacts on individual industries, regions or countries. After a
survey of relevant literature, the paper then moves on and seeks to identify possible win-lose
situations in a single European currency area for European industries as a result of locational
shifts that are likely to take place after the introduction of the Euro. Since obviously no
historical data on the impacts of the Euro do exist, the assumption is made that the Euro will
create efficiency gains in terms of transportation costs and industrial scale economies. Then,
in a retrospective sense, two scenarios are developed and assessed, addressing the question5
what would have happened in the past, if there would have been (i) a fixed European
exchange rate and (ii) a fixed exchange linkage with the dollar. The research methodology is
based on training methods incorporated in neural network analysis. The information base for
our empirical analysis comprises detailed data on industrial production, interest rates and
exchange rates in the various European countries. In this way, the foreseeable and likely effi-
ciency and distributional effects of a monetary union can be traced.
The paper has the following structure. Section 2 will introduce the theory of optimum
currency area and critically discuss its formulations and implications for Europe. In Section 3
the attention is focussed on trade theory and industrial location theory in order to offer the
basis for our analysis of the distributional impacts of a single currency - as a result of a
decline in transaction costs - on industrial concentration in the various member countries.
Since a formal operational model for assessing such impacts does not exist, we argue in
Section 4 that a neural network approach may be a fruitful analytical framework for empirical
research in this area. After a discussion of the database, we present in Section 5 various
results of ’what...if...’ scenarios for individual countries in Europe, while the paper is
concluded with a few reflective remarks.
2. Pareto Optimality in an Optimum Currency Area
A critical success factor for a single European currency area is price stability of the
Euro. The maintenance of price stability will be the main competence and task of the inde-
pendent European Central Bank. In the Maastricht Treaty (1991) already stringent entry
conditions for participating countries were stated, in particular on the convergence of various
macro-economic indicators. The necessity of independence of monetary authorities in
achieving price stability is clearly explained by the political economic theory of stable macro-
economic policy. The theory of central bankers’ independence sets out that independent
monetary policy is a sine qua non for welfare gains of the participating countries. Seen from
this perspective, a strong Euro - under the supervision of a competent European Central Bank
- would lead to a fair distribution of welfare gains to all participating countries (see for more
details Blackburn and Christensen 1989; Prast 1996). This would then be a nice example of
’club externalities’.
The independent central bank approach however, fails to recognize sufficiently the
costs of introducing a single currency, particularly in terms of political acceptance costs in
convincing candidate countries to join. The goal of price stability would then have to be
traded-off against other policy objectives, such as a fair distribution of integration benefits.
Precisely the latter point is a source of concern, as the gains of integration will only lead to an
equitable outcome among all participants in case of equal competitive conditions with free
mobility of capital, goods and labour. In the current heterogeneous European situation - with6
a great many cultural-linguistic barriers and significant welfare discrepancies among the EU
countries - these conditions are not met. Consequently, in the short to medium term a Pareto-
optimal allocation will not materialize; there will be winners and losers.
In this context, the theory of Optimum Currency Area (OCA) plays an essential role
in the current debate on the welfare benefits of the introduction of the Euro. This theory
argues that a monetary union among different countries may be efficient, if the result of a
single currency in the whole area is about equal. This is based on the assumption that free
exchange of goods, capital and labour will create gains of trade and will improve macro-
economic performance (in terms of inflation rate, employment e.g.) due to the exclusion of
internal fluctuations in exchange rates and interest rates. Even countries characterized by high
macro-economic disparities in terms of production or employment may benefit from a single
currency area, if these countries have an entirely free factor mobility. Thus, a clever combi-
nation of different countries may lead to significant macro-economic benefits for all players
involved, caused by a decline in transaction costs, information costs and exchange costs. The
result will be a rise in international trade - and hence gains of trade - between the participating
countries (see e.g. Mundell 1961, 1998; Tavlas 1993).
On the other hand, if macro-economic adjustments among different countries forming
a single currency area are largely asymmetric (and thus also country-specific), then the price
and wage flexibility is insufficient to meet the conditions of labour mobility and automatic
stabilisation by federate taxation and government expenditure policy (cf. Heylen and Van
Poeck 1995).
Against this background, two analytical questions now emerge: (i) has the OCA
theory a sufficient theoretical and empirical validity, and (ii) does the newly created EMU
fulfil the conditions of an OCA?
In regard to the first question, a long debate has taken place after the first publication
on an optimum currency area among different countries by Mundell (1961). In the literature
particular attention has been given to the conditions specified by the OCA theory and the
distribution of costs and benefits of a single currency area. The OCA theory takes for granted
a trade-off between a reduction in transaction costs and unfavourable macro-economic effects
in a monetary union due to the elimination of exchange rate risks. The gains are mainly meso-
economic in nature and accrue to the international industry; the costs are mainly macro-
economic adjustment costs to tackle shocks in the economy (e.g., in terms of employment),
while some countries may also lose because of seignorage capacities (De Grauwe 1994).
Clearly, a necessary condition for an OCA is that the gains be higher than the costs. In a
currency area with high labour mobility the adjustment costs will be lower than in an area
with wage and labour rigidity. Thus an OCA has the highest net monetary integration benefits7
in combination with a maximum factor mobility.
In subsequent discussions on the validity of the OCA theory various extensions have
been added, such as the degree of openness of the constituent areas (see McKinnon 1994), the
degree of product diversification (cf. Kenen 1989, the degree of financial integration and the
degree of similarity in inflation rates (see Masson and Taylor 1993). In recent years, it has
also been argued that macro-economic shocks will cause in particular severe problems in a
currency area when these are a-symmetric (in other words, when the countries concerned
have dissimilar economic structures) (see also Eichengreen 1993).
Therefore, it can be argued that the net gains of a currency area are largely determined
by country-specific conditions. According to some estimations undertaken by the European
Commission, the cost savings after the introduction of the EMU may amount to some 1 to 1.5
per cent of GDP of the participating countries as a result of a decline in transaction costs (see
Gros and Thygesen 1995). In addition, there may be dynamic (e.g. generative) benefits
caused by endogenous growth which may far exceed that static allocative integration benefits
and which may amount to 4.5 to 6.5 percent of GDP (see Baldwin and Venables 1995).
In conclusion, the findings from the long lasting debate on the OCA theory have not
yet led to unambiguous conclusions. In particular, the country-specificity of monetary
integration benefits make the OCA theory a conditional growth theory, where the gains are
dependent on a-symmetric developments that are largely determined by historical, cultural
and geographical factors of participating countries.
The second question whether the EMU forms an OCA is in principle easier to answer.
Given the low level of factor mobility among European countries, smooth adjustments will
likely not take place. A-symmetric shocks may cause high macro-economic disadvantages
(see Masson and Taylor 1993). Seen from this perspective, the EMU is certainly not an OCA.
It is however, a different question whether a given country should participate in a
single currency area; the costs of non-participation may also be high. De Grauwe (1996) has
argued that there are three reasons why the OCA theory cannot answer the latter question: (i)
one has to estimate also the positive effects of a single currency area and not only the costs;
(ii) there is no benchmark to measure the critical level of adjustment costs beyond which
countries would better stay alone; (iii) the role of the exchange rate in relation to the
adjustment of the economies in case of a-symmetric shocks is ambiguous, as many shocks
appear on the sectoral or micro level. In fact, none of the tradition OCA-criteria can
determine the optimal size of the set of participating countries in a single currency area,
because these criteria are only selective instruments to minimize the costs due to a-symmetric
shocks. In addition, it should be mentioned that the shocks may also be endogenous; for
instance, Frankel and Rose (1996) argue that the correlations between the business cycles of8
distinct countries are dependent on the level of integration of trade activities.
The reason for the failure of the OCA theory to offer conclusive answers is probably
best expressed by MJlitz (1995): "Yet the only visible advance in the (OCA-) theory since
Mundell is the proposal of new criteria for determining the optimal size of a currency area.
The subject will remain in the same informal state in which Mundell left, and any effort to
delve into the matter soon reveals the absence of agreement about some of the most
elementary questions regarding the theory... [The fault] lies in the professions’ unwillingness
to adopt a formal analysis of the subject divorced from the policy aspects".
This ambiguity may perhaps also explain the current situation in Europe, character-
ized by a dual speed introduction and acceptance of the EMU. There is still much uncertainty
about the likely impacts of the introduction of the EMU, not only from a macro-economic
perspective but also from a meso-micro (industrial) perspective. In the next section we will
pay in particular attention to the latter category of effects.
3. The Regional-Industrial Dimension of Monetary Integration
In a single currency area exchange rate adjustments are ruled out, but as a
consequence serious impacts may emerge in the real economy (e.g., shifts in employment).
An OCA does not necessarily mean an area with an optimum level of social welfare.
In the present section we will conceive of monetary integration as a reduction in
transportation costs for international trade. The decline in trade costs can be further analyzed
by making a reference to international trade theory and to regional growth theory. Changes in
transportation costs will have consequences for industrial location and for agglomeration
economies. In our analysis we will take a look from a different perspective than the OCA-
theory: in contrast to the assumption that differences in economic structure cause high
adjustment costs as a result of a-symmetric shocks, we assume that the economic structure of
a country is not entirely exogenous, but is also endogenously determined through changes in
the currency system.
To address this point, we will first discuss the static role of a single currency for
industrial development based on the theory of international trade and regional integration.
Then we will pay attention to the consequences of a single currency by using Krugman’s new
theory on economic geography by assuming that a single currency manifests itself as a
reduction in transportation costs (see Krugman 1994).
The conventional international trade theory argues that trade activity between
countries increases welfare because of comparative cost advantages of each country, which
leads to product specialisation. Following the Hecksher-Ohlin theory, we also know that the
supply of production factors affects international trade patterns: a country with abundant
cheap labour would export those products which are labour intensive, because the factor9
rewards will be higher in this case. More recently, much attention has been focused on trade
in homogeneous goods; in this context, it has been pointed out that also monopolistic
competition and scale economies may generate substantial welfare increases emerging from
international trade as a result of market expansion and rising choice opportunities of
consumers (see Kenen 1989; Krugman 1994).
The current real-world trade patterns are still strongly hampered by trade barriers,
both nature-given and man-made. Regional integration then emerges, if such barriers are
removed, e.g. through the creation of a customs union or a common market. The impacts of
trade liberalisation can be analyzed by using the model developed by Baldwin and Venables
(1995). This model starts off from the following expenditure equation:
E = wL + rK + X [(p+t) - a (w,r,x)] + tm - I (3.1)
with:
E: total consumer expenditures
L: labour
K: capital
X: total domestic product
I: investments
p: price
t: unit trade (transport and transaction) cost
w: wage rate
r: interest rate
a: average product cost (depending on factor payments and average product volume
per firm)
tm: revenues from trade barriers accruing to domestic population
The following utility function is assumed for a representative member of society:
V = (p + t, n, E) (3.2)
with:
n: product variety
Next, by taking  the total differential of the utility function and by dividing this
result by the marginal utility of expenditures, we obtain:
dV/Ve = tdm - md [t - "t] - mdp
+ [p + t - "] dX - X"dx + (Vn/Ve) dn
+ (r/s - 1) dI (3.3)10
with:
s: social rate of discount
Expression (3.3) allows now to decompose the welfare effects of trade liberalisation
into 7 successive factors:
(i) volume effect: trade liberalisation influences trade volumes between countries,
leading to a rise in international trade.
(ii) trade cost effect: the advantages of international trade have to be corrected for a term
"t representing the leakage effects of trade duties for domestic agents.
(iii) terms of trade: welfare changes cause a shift in exchange rates between the countries
concerned.
(iv) output effect: a welfare effect due to a change in industrial output of firms where the
price is not equal to average costs.
(v) scale effect: changes in average costs as a result of a rise in industrial scale.
(vi) variety effect: welfare effect caused by a rise in the variety of consumer products.
(vii) trade-off effect on welfare between investments and consumption: investments will
negatively affect consumption, but the fruits of investments may be higher returns in
the future (depending on the ratio of the interest rate vs. the social rate of discount).
These various components can in particular be used to trace the effects of trade
liberalisation, but they may also be useful in assessing the impacts of a monetary union. The
Baldwin-Venables models treats changes in prices and trade costs as determinants of welfare.
If a monetary union leads to a decline in transaction costs and if such costs are conceived of
as component of trade costs (MJlitz 1993), then this model may be used to estimate the
welfare implications of monetary integration. In particular, this model is then able to show
that changes in the following variables may be expected: the trade volume, the prices and the
terms of trade in case of perfect competition; and the industrial output, the scale economies
and the product variety in case of imperfect competition. And finally, there will be investment
changes as an indirect effect resulting from the previous six factors which impact on welfare.
In addition, a monetary union will lead to more price stability, but the impact of this
phenomenon will depend on the price elasticity of the various goods. As a consequence, a
monetary union will have different effects on different industrial sectors, not only in terms of
the above mentioned factors, but also in terms of their location (including the scale
economies). This is supported by Ricardian comparative cost theory which would argue that
changes in relative cost structures of goods would affect their comparative advantage, so that
changes in product specialisation and hence also in industrial location will take place. The
analysis of these effects will now be undertaken with reference to recent studies on the trade11
and location aspects of economic geography (see Krugman 1991, 1994). 
Economic geography and international trade theory offer two complementary
analytical frameworks; economic geography investigates the locational behaviour of
industries (as a result of production costs, transportation costs (including trade barriers) and
agglomeration benefits), while international trade theory focuses attention on the quantitative
and qualitative dimensions of commodity flows between different countries. A full
integration would mean that impediments to international trade vanish, so that only the
location of production in space remains as a possible response of economic actors. Seen from
this perspective, a reduction in transportation (and transaction) costs in a given country is not
necessarily favourable, as the decisions where to locate a given activity will be co-determined
by the relative production costs, transportation costs and agglomeration advantages.
Especially in case of monopolistic competition industrial scale advantages tend to lead to
large-scale concentrations of international industry. The nature of these scale advantages is
determined by two types of linkages, viz. forward (demand) and backward (supply) linkages.
The first category refers to a situation where a clustering of industries in a given area leads to
overall benefits for all industries through a rise in the demand for their products. The second
category of linkage effects emerges from the supply side through cost savings mechanisms of
all industries.
The latter reasoning has far reaching implications for the question whether trade
liberalisation will favour social welfare (and hence for the question whether the EMU will
increase welfare of the European citizen). It is noteworthy that the generally accepted wisdom
is that the european economic and monetary integration will stimulate a convergence of the
economies of the participating countries, that the economic structure of these countries will
become more homogeneous and that it is beneficial for the less wealthy European counties to
join the ’EMU-club’. However, the above sketched analytical framework points out that
economic and monetary integration may easily lead to more diversification in the economic
structure of these countries, as a result of regional concentration of the industry caused by
scale economies in a monopolistic competition market.
Furthermore, there is no guarantee that weaker economies would benefit from
integration. According to Krugman and Venables (1990) it is very well possible that a new
industrial economic structure will emerge after integration, through which the competitive
position of peripheral regions (caused e.g. by low wages) is eroded, since multinational
industries may prefer a location in central areas in order to benefit from scale economies and
better access to large consumer markets, so that peripheral areas may become the losers.
Against the background of the previous political-economic expositions on economic
and monetary integration effects, we will next in the second part of this paper test the
hypothesis whether monetary integration (or at least a system of fixed exchange rates) in an12
economic union will lead to industrial concentration and hence to unequal benefits for
participating countries. This empirical analysis will be presented in the next sections.
4. Analysis Framework
In this section we will concisely describe our methodology for testing the hypothesis
whether a common currency area tends to favour industrial concentration in geographically
accessible (usually central) areas. Clearly, for the time being there is no formal model to
describe the complex relations between commodity flows associated with international trade
and industrial (re)location behaviour of internationally-oriented firms. Neither a simple
regression model nor a complex spatial equilibrium model would be able to capture the
complex causal relationships between various trade and location factors. Furthermore, the
limited data set would hamper a multi-dimensional path analysis. Seen from this perspective,
the use of neural network (NN) analysis seems to be appropriate.
NN analysis is both an exploratory and explanatory research method with the capacity
to generalize from experience, without fixing - a priori - any behavioural rule or model
among variables (see e.g. Himanen et al. 1998). Sometimes NNs are also coined artificial
neural networks (ANNs). NNs may be defined as "richly connected networks of single
computational elements. The fundamental tenet of neural computation (or computational by
ANNs) is that such networks can carry out complex cognitive and computational tasks" (see
Merah and Wah 1992). NNs have become a popular research methodology, as they are able to
imitate the rich human brain functions based on a system of dendrites. Like the human brain,
the structure of NN analysis is formed by a large number of neurons which form an
interconnected network. The connectivity between neurons is based on weights, also known
as synapses. The major feature of NNs is that they can learn through the supply and
processing of empirical data (also coined patrons), so that by means of successive learning
experiments the weights can be approximated. In other words, NNs learn about real-world
linkages through the patrons supplied to them. The result of the learning phase is the
computation of weights, based on the repeated application of training experiments leading to
analysis rules (see also Chester 1993; Nijkamp and Reggiani 1998). NNs have a micro, a
meso and macro structure, through which the interdependent relationships can be depicted.
This structure determines also the connectivity framework of neurons, in particular the way
the weights between the neurons will be computed and processed. An important distinction in
the structure of NNs is between feedforward and feedbackward NNs. A feedbackward NN
allows for cyclical connections between the neurons (like bidirectional connections), while a
feedforward NN does not.  A typology is given in Figure 1.13






Figure 1.Types of connections between neurons, source: Mehra and Wah (1992, p. 50)
After the structure of the NN is determined, the next step is to train the network. This
is done by a learning algorithm which "seeks to adapt a network’s parameters (usually its
weights) and/or its structure in order to make future outputs more desirable" (see Mehra and
Wah 1992). This learning is essential, as then the basic information on the environment at
hand is provided by preparing the NN to recognize and classify the underlying patterns.14
There are different ways to train the network and to use learning algorithms for
solving NN problems. In our analysis, we will use a so-called backpropagation NN, which is
a basic NN model. The features of this model are: (i) the presence of at least one hidden layer;
(ii) a feedforward structure; (iii) a learning algorithm which uses the the bias between the
computed and the real output during the computing stage of the weights (see Kasabov 1996).
A multilayer NN structure has inter alia the following properties: (i) a precise
approximation via a goodness-of-fit based on multiple hidden layers (and multiple neurons in
these layers); (ii) the use of multivariate nonlinear regressions models.
After the exposition of the research methodology based on NN analysis, we will now
concisely describe our empirical framework. The main objective is to trace the expected
effects of fixed exchange rates in an economically integrated market on the international
location patterns of industries, with a particular view to concentration tendencies in central
areas. As a rough indicator for industrial concentration we will use here the relative size of
the industry in a given country in a joint currency area.
From all countries under consideration the following common data base has been
constructed based on a time series for the period 1975-1996 for the input data:
-  (changes in) the interest rate on quarterly government bonds
-  (changes in) the exchange rate with respect to the US dollar,
and for the output data:
- total industrial production in each of the 15 EU countries (and Norway) as well as the
EU as a whole (based on the OECD statistics from the electronic databank
Datastream).
These data are available in index figures, based on nominal values of the variables corrected
for the exchange rate with respect to the US dollar. The base year is 1990. All these data have
multi-causal connectivity structures. In order to test now our basic hypothesis we will use a
feedforward, multi-layered NN model (on the basis of the so-called generalized delta-rule
learning algorithm). This backpropagation NN model will be applied here using the so-called
Neuralyst softwareprogramme (running under Excel).
Based on the above data base, the total number of neurons is equal to 22 (exchange
rate, rate of interest, change in exchange rate, change in rate of interest, a time dummy
variable and 17 dummies for the countries (15 for all EU countries, 1 for Norway and 1 for
the EU as a whole). The total number of patrons would then be 22 * 12* 17 = 4,488.
However, as a result of the backpropagation mechanism using both input and output variables
and as a result of a mismatch between the two input variables and the output variable in terms
of time period, the total number of patrons is at the end 3,691. From this number, a total of
811 is used as a validation set. The remaining set is randomly distributed as a test and training
set in the proportion 1 to 4, respectively. The next section will now be devoted to the15
empirical analysis.
5. Empirical Analysis
Given the NN methodology outlined above and the empirical data described, the
application of the NN model took place in two stages.
In the first stage, the training was carried out, based on a gradient descent learning
algorithm. Clearly, several problems inherent in a backpropagation procedure had to be coped
with, such as local minima, convergence and overfitting. In our case, different numbers of
neurons and hidden layers were used. The test statistic for the performance of the NN experi-
ments is based on the Average Relative Variance (ARV), defined as:
N
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where yn is the observed value of the dependent variable (i.e., industrial production), Õ is 
      O
the computed value of this variable and y the average value. The closer ARV is to zero, the
higher the goodness-of-fit of the NN model.
In our empirical analysis, the value of ARV turned out to lead to very favourable
outcomes, viz.:
ARV (validation set) = .032
ARV (test and training set) = .053
Given the confidence in the overall NN goodness-of-fit, we may now move to the
second stage, viz. the further investigation of policy options on the introduction of a single
currency for industrial production and location. If we take for granted that in the past two
policy options have existed, viz. fixed exchange rates and flexible exchange rates, and that the
economic performance of the various European countries was (partly) the result of flexible
exchange rates, we may raise the question: what would retrospectively have happened if these
countries would have decided to have fixed exchange rates? This ’what... if...’ question can be
investigated by using a backpropagation NN approach. In this way we would also be able to
test our hypothesis on the link between a single currency area and industrial concentration.
In our analysis we take for granted two retrospective policy scenarios for the above
question, viz. (i) the introduction of a common currency area within Europe itself, and (ii) the
establishment of a fixed link between the European currency and the US dollar.16
In the first scenario we have fixed exchange rates in Europe, but still fluctuations with
respect to the dollar. This case is studied by fixing the exchange rates of the European
countries with respect to the German Mark (DM) in the first year for which our data for all
countries concerned were available (i.e., 1975). For the EU as a whole this base year was
1984. Thus, in our approach the DM acts as some sort of ’numJraire’.
The empirical results of this scenarios experiment are depicted in Figures 2 to 4.
These figures show that the impact of fixed exchange rates on industrial production is indeed
significant, viz. a monthly positive effect ranging from .007 percent to .2 percent.
The positive effects of a common currency appear to be rather evenly distributed. For
the Italian industrial production high gains are to be expected, whereas for Germany and The
Netherlands even negative economic impacts are computed. It is also interesting to observe
that the gains of industrial trade and location are fairly neutral for the Belgian economy.
Thus, it is clear that the EMU will have substantial distributional impacts on individual
countries and regions as a result of cumulative effects of fixed exchange rates on industrial
production and relocation. A common currency area may thus worsen the competitive
position of those countries which have had a strong industrial profile. It is also evident that
under such conditions the EMU is definitely not forming an OCA. It has to be added of
course, that in a very long term perspective the EMU shocks may be better absorbed by the
individual countries, so that then they may also reap the fruits of an OCA.
 The second scenario assumes that the exchange rates are fixed in the year for which
for the first time the data are available for each individual country. As shown in Figures 5 to
7, these results lead to a more complex picture. The industrial production in Italy gets a
positive shock from 1992 onwards (i.e., the completion of the internal European market), but
negative effects in previous years. For The Netherlands and Germany - and also for the EU as
a whole - the net effects are again not very promising. Belgium shows in this case wild
fluctuations. Thus, there are clearly winners and losers in Europe. Therefore, we may
conclude that policy scenario 2 cannot boost a high economic benefit for most EU countries.
We may conclude that ex post a single European currency would have had great
impacts on individual countries, but the impacts are unequally distributed. Thus we may
formulate the tentative conclusion that the introduction of the EMU will likely lead to a
significant change in the industrial development in the various member countries.
6. Concluding Remarks
The introduction of the Euro incorporates both costs and benefits. The nature of the
costs is not known, as we do not have experimental results on the convergence effects of a
single European currency area. NN analysis may offer a methodological framework for
analyzing retrospectively the foreseeable effects, based on historical data. In our empirical
work two policy scenarios were investigated, which both showed substantial distributional17
impacts on individual countries and a doubtful effect on the EU as a whole. The EMU is cert-
ainly not an OCA and this condition will show up in future industrial developments,
especially during the first decade of the monetary transformation and integration.
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